

Samuel Levi

Identity and Integration



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The formation of any community, whether confessional, ethnic, or cultural, is based on common experiences (holidays, customs and rituals), which glorify certain historical events that are key to the community. Legends and myths created on the basis of historical events (redesigned according to the community into heroic prototypes) form the cultural environment, which shapes the identity. In this regard, there are no exceptions for any identity. So the same event in two different communities (identities) has a diametrically opposite narrative. Particularly where the boundaries between separate communities (identities) are blurred or difficult to distinguish. In the Balkans this specificity is the regular. Thus, a hundred kilometers away, the same events can be referred to as extremely heroic or deeply tragic. In other words, a total overturning of the past reality into a quasi-reality. Where the sympathized story loses ground or is too short to be made heroic, it is filled up with patriotic moods, united around a few of the experienced events or fabricated events. Thus, for example, the self-consciousness of the United States is formed, ethnically and religiously versatile, but united around the glory of America (the American Dream).

Now a new ethnic community is formed in the Balkans - the Macedonian community. We can be sure that here, where the opposite is true – the history is more than the communities can bear, it is misrepresented and served in a way to glorify a certain national origin (even primordiality) and grandeur over other communities. This is normal, as it forms self-awareness available to each member of the community, however limited his intellectual abilities are. This is the mechanism for forming a community identity. The formation of this national self-consciousness will require a unity of faith (religious

affiliation) and its introduction into the ritual festivity of the community. Even more, it is also necessary to introduce these elements as primary and fundamental in the basic laws of the country. In addition, these elements are preserved and even become dominant, despite the secularization of the state and religion, and the separation of generic communities in the national organization. This is in fact the principle of formation of the identities - whether internal or external - distinction (differentiation) and identification. Every identity is formed around certain frames, namely - mythological, cultural, linguistic and religious cores. These cores also contain the peculiar "genetic" code of the individual's generic, national, ritual, and religious identity. According to these identities, he socializes and self-identifies. According to them, he realizes himself in the society or self isolates. Without their recognition, the participation of the person in the given community is impossible.

This means that the very meaning of identities requires differentiation from others – extraneous (the otherness) and identification with their own. Hence the serious problem of identity boundaries. Where exactly does "one's own" identity end and exactly where does "someone else's" identity begin. This is equally valid for both the inner (the generic) identity and the external (national) identity. Where does the inner identity at the level of a family line end - to a second cousin or to a fourth cousin, is the brother-in-law in the family line or not, and so on? From which family is the married daughter - of that of her father or of that of her husband. In most traditional cultures considered as primary, the male principle is defining. I.e. all the daughters-in-law come to their new families as "outsiders," knowing they must become part of the new family. Marriage is in fact a separation from the bride's family and entering of a new

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one. She must acquire the identity of the mother-in-law, her socio-cultural dimensions, to follow her examples, her ways of order and communication. Her mother-in-law in return, also came to this family as a stranger, but has already been initialized as belonging to this family to such an extent that she is already a role model.

The very process of initiation is actually the acquiring of a new socially higher identity. It is obvious that even the inner identity, with all its conservatism, presupposes to a certain extent the inclusion of the extraneous. Then national identification, especially within the formation of the national consciousness, becomes the main and determinant that “suppresses” (leaving second) the generic identity. Here is a Bulgarian example: Stefan Verkovich is from Bosnia and Rakovski is from Kotel, but this is no longer relevant in the formation of their common national identity mark, although one of them worked within the borders of today’s Greece (Verkovich) and the other in the territory of today’s Romania and Serbia (Rakovski) – i.e. - at the two opposite ends of the formation of the Bulgarian national identity. Again, within the identification marks, another important difference must be noted - Verkovich is a Catholic, and Rakovski - an Eastern Orthodox Christian, which clearly seems not to change things. Although Verkovich was brought up by Franciscans, and Rakovski - by Greeks (all of them “extraneous”). Apparently, the generic identification here has been raised to a higher level in order to accommodate different generic and religious identities.

What comes to the inner identity, the same applies to the external (national) identity to the same extent. The difference between “extraneous” and “one’s own” is difficult to distinguish – are Bulgarians and Macedonians

second cousins if we accept the traditional family relations or fourth, - this is a question to which there is no answer and there is no way to have one. Are they strangers or of the same “ancestry”, what are they? This also explains the position on the specificity of the ethno-cultural borders of the Balkans, and not only there. They are utterly blurred. Other countries are in the same situation - Switzerland, Belgium, Estonia, Finland (Finns and Swedes) and so on. Accordingly, the emergence of the phenomenon of “daughter-in-law” (the extraneous within the family) from the inner identity in the external identity is also well known. Moreover, it is a social practice. Thus, there is a precondition in the external identity - it must include all elements existing within its geographic territory, different generic cultures, and different ethnic, linguistic or religious practices. In short - all “extraneous within the family”. Otherwise, it will not be fully functional.

The social psychologist Ivan Hadjiyski gives a very illustrative example of the boundary between “one’s own” and the “extraneous” in the identity. The main battle between two neighboring villages, with one language, one faith, same holidays and traditions, same patterns of dressing, was where the pocket of the female apron had to be. To the right or to the left. For this, according to him, many inter-settlement battles took place. Simply it was the only identifying factor of the identity of the two settlements. Each of these settlements held up this distinction as a demarcation line between “one’s own” and the “extraneous”. The external identity must unite these two (and many other, considerably larger) differences as commonly found in their own, at a slightly higher level. In the name of the common history (mythology), in the name of its heroism, to include all inner identities, regardless of their size, under one specific common ethno-cultural model. This means to

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include even the smallest identity, as in the case of the pocket of the female apron, as its socio-cultural specificity and to present itself with it, not to deny it. The external identity is therefore more streamlined than the inner one. It can and must accommodate all differences by uniting them at a higher level. To unite on the basis of common history and mythology, with its heroism, which is common for all internal identities.

In some cases, the inner identity is determining and generating the external identity. For example, in the creation of Saudi Arabia, occupying a large part of the Arabian Peninsula, Abdul Aziz bin Saud imposed the identity of his ancestry as determining for the country. It happened in 1932, but it is still valid today. The inner identity of the Saud tribe gives the name to the state and imposes a new inner identity on nearly 40 Bedouin tribes. To this day, Saudi Arabia has a King, Prime Minister, Supreme Judge, Commander-in-Chief in the face of the son of Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud. Accordingly, all members of the Council of Ministers are of the al-Saud family and only they can hold these positions. Thus, the inner identity of one ancestry is imposed as the external identity of one of the largest countries in the world (over 2 million square kilometers). Generally, such an imposition of internal identity as a structurally identifiable external identity qualifies as a dictatorship and is always associated with enormous problems in the possibilities to enjoy human rights. Such unification of internal and external identity is in fact the desire of every dictator. In this case, the personality of Abdul Aziz al-Saud has been mythologized and displaced the need for a unifying figure at the national level to unite different identities. There is an opposite principal in democratic countries. Only such individuals are mythologized,

which unite and make place for all internal identities in the country.

This is precisely the reason for the mythologization of Vassil Levski's image in our country - he is the unifying figure that raises universal recognition of all internal identities, regardless of the differences between them. In Italy, people equally admire Giuseppe Garibaldi (a sworn Republican) and King Victor Emanuel II, precisely because they are people who united, and not because of their conceptual, social, cultural and political differences, even incompatibilities. In the United States, such a person is Abraham Lincoln, not only because he fought against slavery, but also because he brought together African Americans and Americans (racially, culturally and linguistically different). It is obvious that the external identity first and foremost should be based on the principle of a wider unity around such a figure (such a myth) that includes (or unites around) the various internal identities existing on this territory. This is somewhat similar to the principle of the nesting dolls (matryoshka dolls) – inside one there is another, smaller one, and so on. Yet be large enough to accommodate all.

Generally, this type of identity originates after the Renaissance in Western Europe (from the second half of the 18th century to the beginning of the 19th century), when the scattered city-states and disintegrating empires are united in greater formations. There, the process of unification required recognition of the same historical events as heroic and mythological. Such a process also took place in Italy (especially after the collapse of the Papal state), in Austria-Hungary and Germany. In the Balkans, however, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire suggested the opposite process - of differentiation. Of acquiring one's own identity by recognizing historical events that

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preceded the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks were looking for it in the Minoan era, the Albanians in the time of Illyria. For Serbs, the creation of their own external identity was associated with Rashka kingdom from the time of the Grand Prince Stefan Nemanja (12th century). The question with the Romanians is more complicated. The history of Romanians before and during the Middle Ages, for the Romanian historians, is filled with contradictions and ambiguities, because the contrary would mean they have to accept the historically established fact, that during Antiquity the “Romanian ethnos” did not exist, and after 681 the territory and population of today’s Romania was an inseparable part of the First and Second Bulgarian Empire, which fell shortly or for a longer period under Pechenegs, Hungarian, Kuman, or other domination at a time when the Bulgarian state was destroyed or disintegrated and weak. Officially, however, it is associated with Dacia.

So the creation of the external identity in the Balkans was a process of separation, differentiation, illusion and opposition of one’s own to extraneous, within the Ottoman Empire. One thing should be clarified – “their own-extraneous” is a name of the communities of other ethnicities and religions, living traditionally within the framework of the new nation. Because of the relatively free movement of people within the Ottoman Empire, such could be found throughout the Balkan Peninsula, and throughout the Ottoman Empire. Thus, one’s own/extraneous becomes part of the new state formation, although it preserves its inner identity while acquiring a new external one. Moreover, this was not a conflict-free process. On the contrary. Separate regions were formed that often confronted each other. Many times including through military action. The First and the Second Balkan

wars (1912-1913) are testimony to these processes. This was also the problem that led to the wars of the time when the former Yugoslavia collapsed (1992 to 2006).

The creation of a new external identity in neighboring Northern Macedonia is a process that will surely lead to conflicting points with the external identities of the neighbours of the new country - Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania. The problem is that there was no Macedonian state in the antiquity and their attempt to present themselves as successors of the state of Alexander the Great (Alexander III of Macedon) has led to serious international problems surrounding its recognition as a state organization. In that sense, the signing of the Prespa agreement partially solved the problems with Greece, but left the question of the acquisition of its own historical identity, so much needed by the new state of Northern Macedonia. With the already distributed (more precisely - divided) history and mythology, and the external identity created on that basis by its neighbors, this poses a complex problem. And it will certainly create a series of conflicts about its external identity that we can expect in the near future.

It is a fact that in the Balkans, the borders between the different ethnic groups are greatly diminished - on the basis of common long-term living within the Ottoman Empire and the relatively freer movement of capital, goods and people within its borders at the time. This also provided for a more serious cultural interpenetration between the different ethnic and confessional communities, such as the adoption of cultural traditions for example. Nevertheless, each national group retained its strict hierarchy of archetypes (its basic cultural values) that shape its identity. Furthermore, even though they constantly communicated and exchanged information among themselves, in their national identification, especially during the period of the con-

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tent formation of the concept of nation in the nineteenth century, it led to the idealization of “their own” and, respectively, the attribution of all possible negatives of the “strangers”. Everything happened again during the common living.

The pursuit of the “nation’s roots” created a peculiar system of mythologies that replace the reality. A typical example is the myth of Prince Marko or Krali Marko (real name - Marko Munjavchevich, known also as Marco Krleviti, Marko Krlevich or Krle Marko. According to the Serbs he is a Serb, according to the Macedonians he is a Macedonian, according to the Bulgarians he is a Bulgarian and according to Romanians – Romanian, respectively he has four places of origin). It is a historical fact that he was a vassal of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, but according to the mythologies of these nations - he waged war against the Ottomans (he fought with Musa Kessaja, with a boy named Gorolemche, liberating seven chains of slaves). It is a historical fact that he was killed in the Battle of Rovine, where he fought as a vassal on the side of the Ottoman Turks against the Voivode of Wallachia Mircea the Elder. This created a peculiar mythology of differentiation, contrary to historical facts, but necessary for external identification. These mythologies function in a particularly anti-historical way, but the ultimate goal is to promote national superiority over the “otherness” even though it was their own. This is how a furious race in counterfeiting of the history of the Balkan nations in the 19th century began. Quasi-scientific mystifications were formed, which created quite a lot of problems in later times. A typical example is Stefan Verkovich’s “Veda Slovena”, which affirmed Bulgarians as carriers of a culture much older than Christianity. This thesis was probably a reflection of the claims of Geor-

gi Sava Rakovski, who considered that Bulgarians were the ancient speakers of Sanskrit. This thesis gains serious support to date in Bulgaria, Serbia and Russia.

These historical and political mystifications work to this day and create serious conflicts based on the pursuit of a “higher” external identity. Nowadays, the problem of Catalonia is the same. A mystification is promoted that the rich Catalonia nourishes the poor Andalusia and Murcia and if they were left alone, they would be extremely rich. But the “otherness” of their “their own extraneous” pulled them back. To a great extent, the problem of “Brexit” is due to the same phenomenon. Britain’s majesty is first-rate culturally, economically and politically, and should not be pulled back by the European Union’s “tail”, represented by Romanians and Bulgarians (“extraneous others”). Accordingly, the Scots are defined as “fascist scum” (i.e., their “their own extraneous”). However, the facts show the opposite. In just one year (2018), the pound has lost 17% of its value, with economists predicting the pound and the dollar to reach one level.

The same is true of the lately promoted slogan: “Europe of Nations”, that is, the national differentiation, not the European unification. The myth of the national grandeur of a nation and its superiority over others (all the rest) was a good basis for forming of external identity that had to somehow build upon the inner one at the cost of an illusory quasi-history (rather mythology), in the name of the common unity of the nation due to the specifics of the inner identity. But the 19th century is not the 21st century. Accordingly, interdependencies between nations (external identities) become much stronger.

The inner identity is a more sustainable (inherited by birth) but very fragile category. In principle, it is a given, formed by the narrowest circle of the ancestry. It holds the

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memory of the ancestral heroes, the history of the family, the faith, traditions, customs and language. It is formed in the family environment. Ergo - this identity has relatively more unalterable and more stable values in most cases and in much rarer cases alterable ones. Such a change is perceived as a negation of the family and relatives, of the personal prehistory of the personality. A person is born as part of his parents and he carries all their marks. A typical case is the biblical legends of Jesus Christ. He is a native Jew, he does not deny his family, traditions and customs, but only their religious identity. Thus, theologians enter a complex mode of explanation as to whether the new religious identity of her son has changed the identity of the God's Mother (Virgin Mary, the Holy Mother) and her other sons. Obviously, the inner identity as primary is also basic, so interference in its respect to some extent is the cause of serious collisions. In this sense, its upgrading with an external identity must be such as to fit it completely, as well as all identities in the group (nation) with all its specifics.

The external identity is more dynamic, while the inner one is relatively more static. The two identities thus formed - both internal and external - can be dichotomous. I.e. – They may not be uniformly classified and in the same order. This is often the source of conflicts caused by social discrepancies. In principle, the confrontation between the two identities only occurs where the larger nesting doll does not want to accommodate the entire volume of the smaller one. In other words, the outside (national) identity does not want to recognize or reconcile the existence of differences in the inner (generic) identity. It is about people whose linguistic, religious and cultural characteristics do not coincide with that of the main mass prevailing in the social environment in which

the external identity is formed (so-called “their own extraneous”). Then, such an external identity must be created to accommodate all inner identities. This is often a problem in the modern world as well.

In the Bulgarian Constitution, adopted just 20 years ago, there is a text indicating that Bulgaria is an Orthodox state without realizing that Muslims represent over 12% of the population and Catholics - nearly 3%. This creates a problem - we cannot talk about one community, what the state is, but at the same time to put dividing lines between its parts. This creates conditions for diverting internal and external religious identities. Let us say a person is Muslim, Jew, or Buddhist, Protestant, Orthodox or Mormon, but living in a country, say, mostly Catholic. Thus, this person is a stranger among his own - the respective community accepts him personally, but not as an identity to the common one, accepts him partially as their own, but not quite, partially extraneous, but not quite again. The category exists in most European countries (excluding Norway, even though such new stories start to emerge there). This is the case in Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, Albania and all Balkan countries.

A special category is created for “their own extraneous”. Such is the situation of the Bulgarians in Serbia, the Turks in Germany (and in Bulgaria), the Chinese in Hungary, the Roma in Europe, the Muslims in France. Most of them are part of a centuries-old history (especially in the Balkans), but this specificity is preserved. A person is born a Muslim, he believes in Islam, but he lives in a country that identifies itself as Catholic or Orthodox, or vice versa – a person is a Christian, an Orthodox Bulgarian, but he lives in a country that is defined as Muslim - for example, Albania.

The inborn identity - inherited as a generic memory -

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conflicts with the state (external) identity. Here we have one external manifestation and another, an inner conviction. The opposition of the two identities could be perceived as schizophrenic, but this state of irreconcilable conflict can escalate through external mainly religious or political means - a change in laws, for example. The external charging of the opposing of the two identities is particularly dangerous, but unfortunately too often exploited. The results are always negative - both for the persons and for the society.

In 1492, King Ferdinand II of Spain and Queen Isabella the Catholic signed a decree according to which non-Catholics should leave the country or become Catholics. All this was dictated not only by the personal beliefs of the Queen and the King, but also by the particularly strong pressure imposed by the Vatican. The result, a flourishing Andalusia, the center of a particularly advanced modern-day thinking, in all aspects - scientifically, culturally and economically, becomes a declining province of Spain. The Moors and the Jews were expelled, and those who were baptized, etc. marranos, were being prosecuted for how far they respect Catholic traditions and whether or not they were secretly practicing their traditional linguistic, cultural and religious practices. The Spanish Inquisition had a lot of work to do. Practically, the marranos remaining in Spain were killed because of the suspicion that they secretly practiced their old religion. This in no way eliminated the dichotomy in the survived marranos. They did not become more Christian or more Spanish.

During the World War II, Jews and Roma were annihilated as "inferior scum of the human race." That resulted in 6 million people killed. The Aryan race never

flourished, despite the efforts of the state machine of the Third Reich. More recently in Bulgaria, a law on religious denominations was passed, according to which small religious communities, for example, Jewish, will not receive state support. Obviously, despite the secularization, religion and state even in developed democracies have not completely separated. A serious prerequisite for escalating this duality. The person feels being under double pressure, and the increase of pressure on one side leads to an increase of pressure on the other side and the result is - radicalization.

This was exactly the case in Bulgaria in the period 1964-1989. The formation of the forcefully imposed idea of a “unified Bulgarian nation”, just as this was imposed both as an external and as an inner identity of the personality. A series of actions – change of the of names and surnames, ban of traditional ritual practices, banning of the use of mother tongue, all of which led to a dramatic process of inflation, practically state bankruptcy, and civil war in the country. 300 000 ethnic Turks (Muslims) were practically expelled from Bulgaria, and entire regions were depopulated. The consequences – undoubtedly during this period radicalization of part of this population began. Several terrorist attacks also happened (some provoked by the authorities). The opposition between Turks and Bulgarians, Muslims and Christians reached the boiling point. Only the role of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) and Ahmed Dogan prevented that, what happened ten years later in the neighboring Yugoslavia of Slobodan Milosevic - civil war, collapse of statehood, finally brought under control by NATO-led military means. Confronting both identities, deliberately or unconsciously catalyzed, leads to dangerous consequences of enormous political and economic significance not only for one group but for entire countries

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and nations.

Undoubtedly, the world, and Europe in particular, did not learn its historical lessons. The events in France and the frequent attacks of radicalized Muslims are to a large extent the result of the systematic state-imposed behavior of disregard and neglect of the inner identity of the people who came from the former colonial states of France - mainly Algeria. Before the attacks began, the world saw cartoons against the main attributes of the Muslims' internal value system - you remember the cartoons in Charlie Hebdo and the mocking texts on Muslim traditions and customs. As the government did not condemn these events, it somehow stood by them, or at least this was the perception of people with a different inner identity.

I.e. - the despising (or deliberate discrediting) of inner identity and its opposition to the external identity influences severely upon the state of mind of every member of that society and he refers the insult not to the particular object (Muhammad, Buddha, Jehovah, etc.), but to his own family memory, including his ancestors and the inmost generic concepts that formally do not appear in the external identity. It is a fact that in France this has escalated in second and third generation of migrants from North Africa who were born, lived and studied in France, but have preserved their generic identity intact. What to say about the Bulgarian Turks, where the past 10 generations were born in Bulgaria only. They have also preserved the generic identity, which suggests that its forcible replacement is impossible, and its replacement as an internal need of the personality is negligible rare as a fact.

There is a church tax in Germany, but Muslims pay

it as well even though they do not belong to any parish. Germany has serious problems with the refugees. They cannot be taxed for a community they do not belong to. The point is that these are factors that are particularly important and should be a lesson to every European. The imposition of this opposition, which started at the beginning of the 21st century (the US bombing and the tragedy that took place in the World Trade Center with the demolition of the two towers), became the main problem of the new century. Also a reason to promote more and more prominently the point of view that multiculturalism is dead. I accept that it is actually dead, but not from "old age" (ineffectiveness in which it was accused), but from its conscious and deliberate murder, through the active gradation of internal identities as more valuable and no as much valuable, as more cultivated and not as much cultivated, as more modern and more retrograde.

The reason for this process lies in the poor memory of history. No one denies the fact that the underlying causes of the two world wars were, in essence, the nationalist motives of this and that nation, perceived to be better than the other. No one denies that the basis of most medieval wars has been the attempt to impose a particular religion and culture as dominant because one was considered to be superior to the other. To take a closer look – weren't the two Balkan wars in their essence, the first - religious, and the second - ethnic, based not on achieving freedom and independence, but on the basis of favoring a certain group (nation) over another.

So at the core of the wars is the imposition of dominance of one culture over another and an attempt to destroy the weaker and the inferior, as perceived. Generally or specifically the reason is the same - proving superiority through violence. That is why multiculturalism had to be

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killed. The question is whether people can do without it. Whether the fault is really in religious, linguistic, cultural and other differences. Let us recall that the three major religions have a common origin.

The difference between Christianity and Judaism is whether the Messiah was already born or he has not been born yet. The difference between Christianity and Islam is generally in who the Messiah is, and what is his name. Otherwise, the narration of all three sacred books is the same, both in regard of events and facts. Then the problem remains in religious practices. The main thesis is that Christianity is more tolerant as a religious practice than Islam. This statement does not stand the test of time. The attempts of many crusades were to conquer Jerusalem. Which is initially a starting point for all three religions. The Inquisition is not a Jewish or Muslim invention. We spoke of Andalusia, where during the reign of the Muslim moors - all three cultures developed there together. Later in the Ottoman Empire, different religions and ethnicities are far less persecuted than at the same time in Western Europe, where Catholicism pursued every non-Catholic person. What about the war against the reformers - in principle, fellow believers and of one nationality with the Catholics. Was not that a fact in the 20th century in Ireland? The fact is that in Israel, no government has ever survived unless it was in coalition with religious parties. The same parties, who imposed on all Shabbat (Saturday) to be a day of prayer, and not to do even the most basic housework (such as putting on your lights when darkening or not driving your car during Shabbat).

In the beginning of 2019 the news was about a Muslim girl from Saudi Arabia, seeking asylum in Aus-

tralia because she did not want to be a Muslim anymore, and she was sentenced to death in her homeland for that deed. It is a fact that such regimes also exist in Asia and North Africa. The attempt to impose a Western-style liberal democracy in North Africa (in the Arab world) gave birth to a reverse reaction - rapid and severe radicalization of the region. The Islamic state was born and a great refugee issue was created, unresolved until the present day. Perhaps both sides were guilty. Wasn't the reason in trying to forcibly impose a new external identity? I have no doubt that this by no means frees from guilt the terrorists, but obviously, the problem of successful opposition to this ugly phenomenon also has such an aspect. Nowadays modernism must find the most successful means of bringing together the different identities so that they can exist together, and not diverge.

By itself, any religious or ethnic doctrine contains the element of oneness, uniqueness, and some form of superiority. What happened in Spanish Catalonia is proof of this. I do not see how Catalonia might be superior to Murcia, Castilla, Navarra or Basque. Then where stems this separatism from, if not from the inner sense of superiority, of championing others. In a religious aspect, the typical case is Ireland, where Catholics and Protestants still hardly tolerate each other despite their united ethnicity, culture and history. What if not the feeling of superiority of the inner identity over the external?

In this case, there is radicalization - Catalonia has not yet dropped its nationalist battle flags, and in Ireland they are currently put on the shelf, but no one knows for how long. These are examples of similar religious or ethnic identity, and imagine would happen in the case of different religious and ethnic ones. Then the implantation of radical practices becomes a very easy thing to do. Let us

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recall the case of Anders Breivik in Norway who, for his religious fundamentalism, stained Oslo with blood and killed 77 people and injured twice as much. It was only eight years ago (in 2011) and it is still fresh in the memory. In this context, the case of Osama bin Laden and the Islamic state are identical in their philosophical nature to that of Anders Breivik.

Ergo - the question is not in the religions themselves, but in their non-traditional, unconventional, misrepresented practices, which instill the sense of inner identity as a suppressed one, but superior by all means over the external. The manifestation of this phenomenon is a more frequent fact in countries with different ethnic and religious practices, but it can obviously be manifested in other cases, such as the example of Breivik. In the modern world, radical ideologies (ethnic, religious) are more a consequence of the imperfections of modern identity that does not know or recognize certain group rights as equal in the community. A typical example in this respect was the expression “Polish plumber”, which is of some pejorative significance and is widely used in United Kingdom with regard to the economically active migrants there. Analogue in our country is “Gypsy work” towards the Roma, who are also indigenous people. In connection to this, a Roma woman exclaimed, “If we were not here to clean for them, they would die in the dirt.” She was not far from the truth.

It is well known across Europe, that the unattractive work is mostly done by Algerians in France, by Pakistanis in UK, by Roma in Bulgaria and by refugees in Germany. In this way, the unattractive work is ethnically associated and is interconnected with certain religious affiliation in the mass consciousness, which is a sufficient reason for

the emergence of negative emotions towards the whole community. If this is accompanied by an everyday life incident, the act immediately becomes ethnically associated or justified by the religious affiliation of the perpetrator. A year ago in Germany, some jerk from Bulgaria pushed a German woman down the stairs. The publications immediately revealed how dangerous the Bulgarians were. This is the case in United Kingdom, Poland and Bulgaria.

The problem is that each identity builds upon a system of heroic acts and myths that create its own rules of socio-cultural relations, and if a certain person is not an empathizer and does not experience their narration as his personal experience, he remains extraneous even if he is ethnically or religiously one of their own. The consequence is - never acquiring a new external cultural identity, and the old one is already lost. This is the case with migrants - be they refugees or economic immigrants. Their group is excluded from the community and they automatically become "not one of us". This largely applies to the refugee issue affecting Europe – we witness the arrival of people who have their own external and internal identity, alien to the hosting country. In this context, the problem of refugees can also be seen in this light. People arrive, with their own internal identity, at the same time they have not completely rejected their national identity, on the contrary, they have preserved it, seeking to preserve their right to life. They find themselves in a new cultural, linguistic, religious environment and this inevitably creates a clash of the already acquired external identity and the new external identity that they must acquire in order to realize themselves socially. There are no mechanisms for adaptation to the traditions and customs of the local culture. Radicalization of both sides is already preconditioned, only something to set the fire is missing. Time and education are needed so

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that their social inclusion and perception of the new external identity adapts to the existing inner one and “reconciles” with the old external identity. This is the same as having two keys - one for your front door (the new outer identity) and the other for the closet (where you can preserve your old external identity). At the end, the external (national) identity is nothing more than a system of shared beliefs that affirms certain values that are to be respected by migrants. There is no known external identity in the world of the 21st century, which, by itself, excludes perception from others, or a priori requires the exclusion of certain internal identities. This was, in fact, required in the 12th-14th centuries, and only by some European (but not all) national identities, mostly in aspect of religious identification, but not everywhere and not in regard of everything.

In today’s world, migration is a normal thing, so national identities should be as far-streamlined as possible and inviting to new inclusions, so to validate their national representativeness. The example is very close - whether the influence of Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Kosovo is commensurate with the influence in the world of the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The question is rhetorical. The opposite example - the identity of the US is based on some made up quasi-rituals such as Thanksgiving, National flag rising ritual, or some Anglo-Saxon holidays, such as Valentine’s Day, and some actual historical events - July 4 - Independence Day. Despite the fact that the main pillars of this identity are historically consistent, today the United States is one of the most attractive countries because of the myth surrounding the realization of the American dream. And the pursuit for an American identity is a widespread phenomenon. Obviously, the United States has

created such a national identity that accommodates many different identities sharing their rituals with others so that they become nationwide. An example is St. Patrick's Day, a purely Irish holiday that became an unofficial US national one. His religious significance is "drawn out" and replaced with a celebration of green garments. Another example is Thanksgiving, a day for thanking God for the harvest, that became a "Turkey Day". On that day, the president pardons the life of one turkey. Obviously, the original meaning of the religious holiday has been profaned (or deliberately profaned to acquire a purely secular mundane character in order to unify differences).

The most typical example of the fundamental replacement of a religious ritual with another - purely secular, and at the same time of the "profanation" of a religious holiday, but so that it strengthens its unifying, purely secular, meaning as a national unifier (a typical example of a way for deliberate unification of uneven masses) is Halloween. The Catholic religious holiday is not on October 31, but on November 1, and it is not Halloween, but the All Saints' Day. A day to honor the dead, not a fair day, not a day of funny and scary masks, not a day of jack o'lanterns, but a day of meeting with the afterlife. The holiday is turned upside down, with a purely secular content: "give to the children with funny costumes sweets and chocolates" has replaced the purely religious beginning and has gained a very unifying narrative - please the children. Something typical of all cultures - caring for children. This is the perfect example of creating a new national festive ritual. The US needs this - their history does not have many heroic events about which to unite. Neither the expulsion of the indigenous population and colonization of the lands of the Indians, nor the war between the North and the South (the Civil War), nor the fight for human rights of African-Americans. It is dif-

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difficult to create heroism of such a nation-breaking story. That is why new unification feasts and rituals overturn the celebration of real history. Moreover - successfully, as long as they can be "exported". Halloween and St. Valentine's Day are already celebrated in Bulgaria.

There are, however, very significant discrepancies between European secular society and American religiosity. The civic origin of modern Europe and the missionary beginnings and the American conviction of the God-chosen beginning of their nation, the critical European thinking and the narrow-shaped American thinking, the European creative skepticism and the American image of social success (optimism), the European participation in the community and the American theological sensation of their nation, the American drive for unification and the European drive for difference. On the other hand, the European cultural tradition has been replaced by the quasi-culture of the show, which, no matter how impressive, does not carry the mental burden of European cultural models. Therefore, these differences reflect on lifestyle, social existence, mental priorities and political ideas. This suggests quite clearly that the EU and the United States are quite different communities that have divergent ideas in many areas, and in many ways, they are more competitors than co-workers. In addition, the very pattern of building and maintaining community ideas and traditions is quite different and, in some ways, diverging. In other words, the implementation of the US model in Europe will most likely be non-functional.

The creation of a new unifying identity on supranational, above religious, above traditional cultural level is a fact that should be known and we should have deep knowledge of it. The world is in the process of constant

globalization. This is a process that is determined not as much by political, but first and foremost, by economic development. It has fundamentally changed social relations, and in turn, they have changed the identity priorities. The closed economy required, above all, the domination of internal identity as fundamental and structurally identifying. The family was busy with one production and all members were included in it. Thus, the inner identity was of utmost importance. With the technological development - the formation of capitalism - already imposed the creation of entire cities working in one sector, so the inner identity lost its economic attachment, but it imposed the creation of a new external identity - external in regard of the inner and unifying different inner identities. It would have ended with the discovery of the steam engine. Then the gasoline engine followed, then the nuclear power, and there was no chance that would not globalize the world. Along with this, there was a change in the identities. Even in the firmest - the inner identity, there was a process of significant loosening of the connections. It became normal for the daughter-in-law and the mother-in-law to have separate kitchens, and what comes to the villages' aprons, if they were still worn, the side of the pocket was already not important, because it was more practical to have two pockets and so on. This "loosening" of the inner identity was also a way to build the external identity. Now is the moment in which the (national) identity must "loosen" its internal links so that the postmodern meta-identity of contemporary EU citizens can be built.

The very process of integration, for example within a united Europe, does not mean that ethnic boundaries are lost in the European Union (state borders are lost - within the community) and that a process of erasing national identities is beginning. On the contrary, they retain their

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core of identities, being accustomed to a newer type of relationship with the “otherness”. From the fact that Greece entered in 1981 the mainly Catholic European Union did not make the Greeks less Orthodox, or the French ethnically closer to the Germans. The terrible predictions from the joining of Bulgaria and Romania the EU have not been met. Since their entering, the EU has not been balkanized or profaned. The inclusion of countries with a large Roma population did not lead to a boom of the so-called “Gypsy crime” in the EU. On the other hand, the EU has been enriched with Roma folklore and duly appreciated. On the contrary, the EU retained their identity. The fact is that at the same time the process of tolerance of individual minorities within the larger entity was reinforced within the union. In general, the smaller one requires better accommodating conditions than the large one. This also requires care that is more specific.

Otherwise, the large inevitability imposes its unification, forcibly installing its core of identities on minorities. This preservation of the inner identity of all EU citizens is a policy that the Union must follow in order to survive as a single entity. Thus, within the union, disjointed and even hostile communities seek common ground and, through economic, political, social and cultural interest, they can form the basis for a unified identity. The Treaty of Rome is a definite proof of how irreconcilable enemies become true like-minded associates. The Maastricht Treaty proves the same. Thus, the EU is expanding its understanding of “their own” and, to a large extent, creating serious preconditions for meaninglessness of the notion of “their own extraneous” within the union. A very serious step in this direction was the start of negotiations with Turkey (with a population almost equal to that of Germany) in 1999 for its accession to the EU. For

purely political reasons, this is not a fact. Although a new reunification of countries is being prepared at EU borders, which would put the EU in great strain. The creation of the Eurasian Union is not a factor that does not deserve attention. The eventual attraction of China to it would make it the world's first economic power.

Today, more than ever, one production is not owned by one family or a country. The elements of space technology are made all over the world. This requires the creation of new social identities. However, the fact that the EU leaders realized this can be found in the slogan "United in Diversity" which the EU used several years ago. Before the spirit of the EU division into more advanced and lagging countries in the Union wedged in, which in turn strengthened nationalist sentiment, i.e. - supported the idea of the exclusive role of external identity. This is a thesis that does not unite, but distinguishes. However, it is a fact that it does not just exist, it quickly comes back to life (like a remake of the time before the World War II).

Overcoming such thinking was and still is a task for the leaders of the European Union. The fact is that in the last 10 years the failure to oppose this policy in this regard was complete. Incompetence, bureaucratic pomposity and lack of a clear vision of the development of the EU as a unity of diversities led to devastating decisions. The thesis of the two-speed Europe emerged, the first is more Europe and the other one not that much European Europe, based on a purely ethnic principal, which ultimately led to the rise of radical nationalism. If we accept the formulation of Blackwell ("The Encyclopedia of Political Thought"), this nationalism, in combination with anti-Marxist socialism, forms a synthesis that generates fascism. It is for this reason that the nationalists so actively deny liberalism, Marxism and democracy (remember Orban's rule of Hungary or

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the rule of Poland's successor to the Kaczynski brothers - Andrzej Duda). According to them, only the nation is the morally unifying mechanism that can create organic collectivity and prosperity in public life. The "I"-identity exists to the extent that it is a projection of the external identity. The inner one - too. Thus, the state is the nation and its identity becomes the only structuring element, and the personality exists insofar as "itself" and its inner identity are in complete accord with the identity of the nation. Which means that the so-called "their own extraneous" should either acquire (at the expense of their "own self" - and inner identity) the norms of the external identity established by the rulers or they will be isolated from the nation. The resemblance to the ideology of 20th century fascism is not accidental. Madeleine Albright also draws attention to the danger of such development of the EU in her book "Fascism: A Warning". Undoubtedly, the next European Parliament shall be so saturated with nationalism (gravitating to fascism) that resolving such a problem by means of creating a new postmodern European meta-identity, shall be almost impossible. It is well known that the forms of fascism and Marxist socialism in the last century have brought Europe to total breakdown.

Germany and France experienced in 1945 two terrible national catastrophes as a consequence of the Hitler regime and that of Marshal Petain in Vichy. Italy after Mussolini was no different. Then why do nationalists rule in Italy, and in Germany the neo-Nazis of "Alternative for Germany" are second political power and why Le Pen almost defeated Macron in France? EU leaders do not answer these questions today. Maybe because they have the foresight of those who have initiated Brexit in Britain, (only informatively the pound has lost more than

17% of its value to this day, before Brexit is a reality). The task of EU leaders was to create such a postmodern identity that would include all internal and external identities as their attributes while being adaptable and open to new or different socio-cultural practices. More generally, a new meta-identity. Otherwise, the purely geographical and territorial expansion of the EU will only deepen the problems that will lead to even more dramatic events both with immigrants and with refugees and with the relations within the community of the Union.

The creation of such a new postmodern meta-identity, open to socio-cultural differences, is not an easy task. However, there are enough artifacts in Europe and America that it can be based on. Such postmodern meta-identities were created in the USA and Canada. With all their imperfections, they turned out to be working. Let us not forget Medieval Andalusia. Or the modern Netherlands, where there are no problems with the identities of Catholics and Protestants, the Frisian and Dutch speakers, the Dutch, Suriname, Turkish, Indonesian, Moroccan ethnicities. Nevertheless, it is one of the richest countries in Europe. Maybe because of that?

Freedom, as such of groups (communities) that maintain a different internal and external identity - be it cultural, religious or ethnic, is not seen as a fundamental problem for the EU. Perceiving all languages as European is not enough. The printing of banknotes in Latin, Greek and Cyrillic are only for show. Necessary, but it is only a demonstration. Without resolving this fundamental problem, we will be looking for Europe at two, three, or five speeds, which makes it very vulnerable and easily destroyable. The lack of a uniform meta-identity of the European Union is a fact that is unquestionable, but that is the main reason for the Union's dysfunctionality, no matter how much it will

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be enlarged.

There is enough reason to seek such a new external meta-identity. The history, the heroic acts and myths are available (May 9, the signing of the first coal and steel treaty in 1951, Changes in Europe - the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Communist regimes, the expansion of the EU , heroes such as Jean Monnet, Winston Churchill, Conrad Adenauer, Robert Schumann, etc. An absolutely solid foundation for the creation of a postmodern pan-European identity.

Obviously, there are enough historical prerequisites to create a common festivity, ceremonies and rituals, closely linked to the EU. In other words, to create, let us call it the theological framework of the new postmodern identity that will give the citizens of the Union new self-esteem in the social psychological dimension. A virtually new identity of an entire continent. The obvious intellectual weakness of the current EU leadership makes the task more difficult, but not impossible. Everything is a matter of will and opportunity. The will is available, as well as because of the acute economic necessity, and opportunities are a matter of leadership creativity.

Let us look at the history. Given the multitude of languages and cultures on the Old Continent, attempts to reunite were usually violent. Victor Hugo made one of the first proposals for a peaceful alliance of equal European countries in 1851. The World War I, a catastrophic one for the continent, was followed by the World War II, which left Europe in ruins. The victorious Allies, firmly resolute to eliminate the possibility of war on the continent forever, and in effort to rebuild Europe, along with a number of European politicians, welcome the idea of a supranational alliance. May 9 is not just the day of

victory over fascism and Nazism, but a day of European awareness of the need for a new, modern Europe, which is not to be ripped by wars and conflicts, but to be a collective player on the world stage like the United States, Russia and China (other victors of the World War II). Such figures as Konrad Adenauer (Chancellor of defeated and divided Germany) and Robert Schuman (Prime Minister of the victorious France) were quite aware of that. This called for traditional enemies to become new allies in the name of Europe's unity. The contradicting external identities were overcome in the name of another higher identity. Such an interpretation of history has not yet been imposed as a model for the formation of the EU as a whole. The heroic beginning is available.

In general, there is a need for a new interpretation and a new narrative of the history of Europe since World War II. Until 1945, Europe's history was a history of wars and conquests, of opposition and antagonisms. Since the end of the World War II, there has not been one, I emphasize, not one military conflict between a single European country with another such EU member state. NATO's involvement in the former Yugoslavia and the establishment of KFOR there was an action aimed at ending genocide and establishing a democratic model of interethnic relations. Such an interpretation of history was not made. Where is the narrative about the US Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program at the initiative of the US) to help Europe, within which the US government granted \$ 13 billion (approximately \$ 130 billion since 2016) to restore the European economy after the end of World War II? The aim of the United States is to restore the areas affected by the war, remove trade barriers, modernize industry and restore economic prosperity in Europe. An entirely new type of relationship between formerly belligerent countries.

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So immediately after World War II, the idea of European unification was not at all relevant to a single political concept or a single integration model. It was about a conceptually new model of functioning of Europe. A fundamentally different philosophical concept of history in which individual political events logically and consistently bring out a fundamentally new model of the functioning of relationships both in Europe and in North America. Such a historical point of view is obviously lacking, and this is why there is a lack on a mental level of consciousness of new meta-identity. Thus, the actual story is submerged in a row of accompanying descriptions of details, supernumeraries and insignificant events so as to lose the order and system of narration, to fragment it, to make it fascinatingly descriptive in detail, and thus to lose the story line.

The story of Germany's reunification is also lacking - the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was actually the unification of Western and Eastern Europe, a unique event in the history of the world when two enemy systems find out that a unification for peace and freedom is more powerful than the nuclear forces of the two systems. That was misread! The fall of the Berlin Wall was not the end of the Cold War because the US defeated the USSR in economic and technological progress. The Cold War ended because Western Europe was mentally attacking the USSR, as well as its satellites. De Gaulle was in the USSR, because Genscher maintained contacts with the Communist regimes, because Mitterrand was in Sofia, because Kohl launched the idea of Germany's unity, and firstly - because the people of Eastern Europe did not want to be separated from the people in Western Europe. That is why there were rebellions in the German Democratic Republic in 1953, the Hun-

garian events (1956), and the charter of Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia (1968), "Solidarity" in Poland with Lech Walesa and Adam Michnik (1979) and Father Jerzy Popiełuszko (1984). There were the dissident movements throughout Eastern Europe. These factors were central to the elimination of the East-West division, not the military advancement of the United States.

The story is reduced to the destruction of a three-meter concrete wall with barbed wire and the events surrounding it, not about the aspirations of the East and West Europeans to create a new world in which people, commodities and capital can freely and flawlessly travel from London to Athens whenever, however and from wherever Europeans find it appropriate to. Thus, the narration about the Berlin Wall was deprived of its essence - the aspirations of the people on both sides of the Iron Curtain to be a community and the obviously existing initial sense of community that the citizens of Europe have never lost, regardless of the political regimes.

The lack of such a true story of New Europe, drastically different from that one of Old Europe, is at the root of the non-acquisition of a new meta-identity. Namely, it will give new citizens a sense of self-esteem, similar to what was built for US citizens. Moreover, the EU has much more historical, cultural and political ground to work in this direction, not on the basis of quasi-history, but on the basis of experienced one. The historical grounds of old Europe are much greater in gaining a proud pan-European meta-identity than the one that apparently functions perfectly in the United States. There is no American, anywhere else in the world, who does not rely on his self-esteem as a citizen of the United States of America. This means a fundamental replacement of the work of the European Commission and the European Parliament. In this sense, the question

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of happy hens should be placed second, compared to the affirmation of this meta-identity as a psychological attribute of every European citizen. Still (and still even in the current leadership) first come people and not the curved cucumbers. This mindless attention to small topics destabilizes the EU and virtually blocks the creation of this identity. This trend was most clearly formulated by Vaclav Havel on March 8, 1994 when he spoke ironically before the European Parliament of “the endless disputes over how much carrots can be imported from somewhere” and set the framework for a European identity charter, which should define the ideas and values on which the EU is based.

Moreover, this identity (more accurately the upgraded meta-identity) gains new dimensions with the inclusion of countries such as UK in the EU (in 1973), the rejection of Franco’s fascist regimes in Spain, the Carnation revolution in Portugal (the end of the fascist dictatorship in 1974), the entry of Greece into the EU (in 1981) and the integration of Eastern Europe from 2004 onwards. In 2012, the EU has been awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize, contributing to over six decades of progress in peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in the world. These events should be seen as interdependent with a relatively longer process - the process of creating a new Europe from 1945 to the present day. As a process of rejecting totalitarian regimes and adopting a unified and common value system across the EU. Naturally as a process of acquiring a new common European identity, that does not reject the existing identities, but builds them up in the same way that the external identity builds on the inner one, and the European meta-identity - on the external one. Such a historical interpretation, unfortunately, was not made and is not per-

ceived as modern and extremely necessary and rational. It would significantly reinforce the cohesion of the EU model. We are talking about a completely continuous process of integration, not just a string of random events - international trade agreements, the abolition of dictatorships at different times in different countries, and so on. Such an interpretation of the history will also change the nationalist attitudes to a great extent, because it will be clear that we can do more united. No European country (mostly small countries compared to the US, China or Japan) cannot be compared to them. Even 83 million people Germany is far from the results of three big ones. What if it was not united? Obviously, there is strength in unity and unity forms the self-confidence of identity.

Romano Prodi, as President of the European Commission, pleaded in the same cooperative spirit before the European Parliament on September 14, 1999: "What we need is to create a union of hearts and minds, backed by a shared feeling of common destiny - a sense of European citizenship. We come from different countries. We speak different languages. We have different historical and cultural traditions and we have to keep them. But we are looking for a shared identity - a new European soul". The same thesis today is defended by Jürgen Habermas, who defines the EU as "the first phase of post-national democracy," and pleads the EU to work for "collective identity ... as well as common values". We can assume that the thesis is relatively old and sufficiently discussed, but obviously without significant progress.

There are also enough other factors to form a proud European self-consciousness. Over half a billion people live in the EU, while the population of the US is 320 million people. The EU produces nearly 20 percent of the world's gross domestic product, equivalent to \$ 17.4 trillion, very

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close to that of the United States (\$ 19.5 trillion) and is much higher than China's, which is \$ 12.2 trillion, although China has a population twice larger than that of the EU. Russia (with a population of 144 million people) has a GDP of 1.57 trillion dollars and economic growth of 1.5%. The real economic growth of the EU is 2.4% while the one US is 2.2%. Another fact - for 10 years as member of EU the average life expectancy in Bulgaria has increased by 2.1 years. Knowledge of these factors must become a reality for every European citizen, as well as the historical events that have led to this prosperity, so that the EU became the most attractive place to live in the world. The EU has not acquired even one tenth of the pride of US citizens. This is the duty of the EU leaders, not the issue with curved cucumbers on the agricultural market. Achieving such a proud identity is not a question of a single solution, but of systematic work in education, something that is not done. No EU country can achieve these results alone, neither as an economy nor as citizens' rights and freedoms, nor as a free movement of capital, goods and labor. This should be valued in the process of creating this new meta-identity.

Technologically the world is a big village. The distance between Australia and Norway is a phone call away. Everyone can see everything to the most remote location. Moreover, technology continues to evolve. Compared to it, even the most modern policies are like medieval wandering monks. This social backwardness must be overcome. Building such a meta-identity can solve a large part of the problems and it will be in accord with technological development. The divergence between technological achievements and socio-cultural relations can have dangerous consequences if it contin-

ues to widen.

The question remains - how to reconcile the different identities that a person is combining (and/or a community is perceiving). In principle, identity gives the person an idea of his own integrity. It helps him feel a sense of self-sufficiency, consistency, perspective and continuity. Identity is what makes the "Self" different from others but also related to them. Thus, we have an intimate identity that is closely related to the inner identity, which actually builds up the intimate by embracing it entirely through the generic memory and upbringing of the individual, which in turn is closely related to the external identity of the person which embraces the inner identity and now we are talking about building a new meta-identity that embraces the external identity. Historically, the process of building awareness of the need for such an identity in Europe began with the end of the World War II. This is not to be thought of as a new construct, a result of a political whim. For the first time, Winston Churchill formulated the thesis in 1946 in a university lecture in Zurich referring to the "European United States". I.e. - a mega-state organization that has its own identity. It is understood that the need for identity is only feasible through the integration of the nation-states in Europe, which inevitably implies the perception of Europe as a single and common construct that gives the impression of integrity, permanence, perspective and value - economic, political and social. It becomes significant and attractive precisely because of these qualities.

We have seen that this is and remains to be the inner necessity of the person, because his participation in this community raises his perspective and social significance. Then why in the recent years the European Union construct is stalling, something that Vaclav Havel publicly revealed 25 years ago? It is too easy to put all the blame only on

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the Brussels administration. Obviously, there are other, much more serious reasons than the incompetence of the clerks. This reason should be sought exactly where it was during the creation of the external identity. The inner identities “our own-extraneous” had to be united around common history, mythology, social practices and symbols, in the presence of common language, religion and manners. However, the formation of the meta-identity of the European citizen had to be done without a written common history (error of bureaucracy), without established mythology (again the mistake of the same), but also without common language, common religion, common morals, common social practices and poorly used symbolism (certainly not mistakes of Brussels).

Let us start with the last - yes, there is a flag that is practically always present next to the national one. Yes, there is an anthem of united Europe, which is usually performed after the national one. Why not first, given that it is more representative than the inner identity. Even its performance is not what the national anthem is entrusted with - everyone's involvement in its performance. It formalizes this symbolism and devalues it, reduces its status in the individual's value system and does not contribute to the formation of self-consciousness and self-dignity towards this identity. The problem is also in education. There are in fact no EU history textbooks, which there are for every external identity. Thus, personalities are not perceived as identifiable with this identity. The establishment of common festivity and uniform rituals is also not a fact. Even May 9 is not solemnly celebrated, but rather mentioned in the news along with the potato price and everyday issues. How does 9 May in the EU resemble July 4 in the US? The question is theoretical and does not require a response. Without

creating such a system of ritual practices and celebrations, the perception of post-modern European meta-identity is not possible.

Finally, most important reason. The inevitable resistance of the external identity to accept that it is part of another, even greater and more significant one. The external identity is still too young (100-150 years old) and too overburdened with prejudices, so it is not easy to abandon them and accept the fact of self-fellowship with the neighboring nation that they have been fighting with until 75 years ago. Attempts to form textbooks of general history between France and Germany did not work. There were such attempts in the countries of Central Europe (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), but they never made to the printed version. As soon as the subject opened in regard of the Balkans, the historians began to scream loudly so that it was quickly buried even before it was titled.

What is the problem to write a common history of the EU? History is also woven by myths, which if included in a common history, must be disowned. It is on them that the external identity is built upon. Writing a common European history will turn some heroes into deserters. For example, Prince Marko, 'The Maid of Orléans' (Joan of Arc), Robin Hood, and thousands like them. This will greatly torpedo the external identity, and that would be a very difficult process. This is the basis of escalation of nationalisms in Europe - from the fear of revisiting and devaluing the inner identity at the expense of a postmodern meta-identity - common to the EU that is not yet there and is about to be born. Therefore, it is best to kill the idea before it is conceived. This to a large extent explains the boom of the "Alternative for Germany", Podemos, the Northern League, Bulgarian chauvinism, Hungarian and Polish chauvinism and the Euroskepticism fueled by them. This is not just

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a movement of ordinary, unenlightened nationalists, but also a movement strongly supported by erudite historians and politicians.

National identity is a key factor in the material and spiritual development of the nation. It unites the nation and gives it a sense of significance and prosperity. This is why it is very necessary when it comes to running a country, as well as for politicians and for the socio-cultural development of the country. Breaking the myths embedded in it shall detonate all historical science and create obstacles to follow the examples of the heroes, something what the leaders are calling on. An example from Bulgaria (not to insult any foreign identity). The academician Georgi Markov, director of the Historical Institute of Bulgaria at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, stated in no uncertain terms, that “the definition of the Ottoman presence in Bulgaria should be “Ottoman slavery” because a possible new and more precise formulation contradicts the “national identity and this should not change”, although he himself realized the error of the definition in textbooks just now. An audit report by EU experts confirmed: “At the time of Europeanization and the globalization of historical research, those who work in the Institute are still too concentrated in the nation and the national. The level of critical analysis, theoretical justification and methodical renewal that the European institutes should aim for, are not yet achieved. Traditional political history still dominates”, cites the report from 2016. That same year Prof. Bozhidar Dimitrov, director of the Historical Museum, discovered in Sozopol “valuable artifacts” from... Noah’s Ark. Which has greatly increased national self-confidence that the world has survived thanks to us, the Bulgarians.

In neighboring Greece there are two unmistakable names of great men, who gave a lot to their country Manolis Glezos, a hero of the anti-fascist resistance (he took down the Nazi flag from the Acropolis) and writer Nikos Kazantzakis, who wrote an open letter to the EU accusing the EC of insisting that Greece repays its loans because that was the home of democracy, Plato and Aristotle and Europe actually owed that to Greece, not the opposite. Extremely impressive and beautifully written. Only the great names of Greece and the rest of the world did not understand that ancient Hellenes and modern Greeks are somewhere after 20th cousins (if any connection can ever be sought) and their identification with them is neither historically nor factually covered. Because they believed, they were their direct successor.

Put in other words, historians and partially the politicians would hardly even tolerate a minimal blur of the external identity at the expense of another one, which is trying to build on it. The fact is that national stories are much more political and too little social and factual. This is taken into account also within the EU, but nothing is really done about it. Because there is no effective mechanism for this to change without causing a burst of disagreement. There is good reason to believe that the new European Parliament will have a much larger group of nationalistic MPs than any other before. Undoubtedly, the reason is in the danger of “taking away” something from the national identity of one of the 28 EU members. This, on the other hand, undermines the unity of the alliance and makes it much weaker and more vulnerable. Which prevents the upgrading of the new identity. A sort of paragraph 22 is created as in the famous novel by Joseph Heller. Thus, the EU remains captive of nationalists who gradually, but surely, erode the EU through the mythological heroes of

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their “own” and the lack of positive qualities in the “extraneous”. Nationalists, even in alliances against their common “enemy” - in the face of systemic political forces, will mark the internal fault lines. The division into “the better” and “the best” is inevitable. Europe cannot afford itself such a new division.

Undoubtedly, the problem arises also from the strong influence of religious institutions on the secular ones. Secularization everywhere is considered to be a complete process, which has long been over, and therefore undisputed. However, whether it is so or not - the facts are different - Pope John Paul II visited the Polish Sejm in 2002. His visit was remarkable - the members of the Sejm welcomed him on their knees. Under the influence of the Catholic Church to this day, abortion in Poland is forbidden regardless of the reasons for it. In Bulgaria, the President takes an oath before the Patriarch and the MPs in the National Assembly. This is seen as a continuation of tradition, but it also brings a clear message about the subordination in the state. In Italy, Spain, France, Portugal and many other countries, the church has a tremendous influence on secular authorities. And this is usually not in favor of the civic principle. Such was the reason for the EU first to declare itself as a Catholic alliance, then a Western Christian one, and then, to this day, a purely Christian alliance (barely accepting the presence of Orthodoxy). Today, if the EU wants to prosper, it will have to accept that the Union is a union of citizens who are Christians, Roman Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants, Muslims - Sunnis and Shiites, Jews, Buddhists, Sikhs, Atheists and others. In the nearly 500 million population of the Union, Muslims are no less than 25 million (5.2 percent). Excluding any religion as uncomfortable for the EU would mean

subverting its status as a first or second power of global influence. It is very dangerous for the EU to divide its citizens by religion. Then it would look like the young housewife who had flaked onions until she had removed the last scale, i.e. she was left empty handed. The EU needs to impose firm and clear rules on the relationships and opportunities over religious institutions to influence the decisions of individual countries. The problems with Hungary are not only a consequence of Orban's political volatility, but also of the growing influence in his governing of the Catholic Church. So let the foresighted European officials, before estimating the redness of a tomato, be sufficiently demanding in keeping with the full secularization of all EU member states.

The other problem is the fear of "their own extraneous" - from Bulgarians, Romanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians in the future and what a horrible thing - probably Albanians! The barbarians are coming! The negotiations with Albania shall begin in June 2019. Perceived in that way, the other EU member states inspire a truly atavistic fear among part of the population of Benelux, Britain, France and Germany. Such was the "horror" of the Polish plumbers, of the Bulgarians "who shall drown" the Great Albion. On the day of Bulgaria's accession thousands of reporters arrived to Heathrow airport, to see the invasion of the barbarians. Well, there was nothing to film really. Mainly Englishmen got off the plane and the barbarians turned out to be qualified doctors and IT-specialists. So the reporters did not know who the real barbarians were. However, the atavistic fear remained. The reason is that the external identity needs this fear as a nation-binding element against the great danger, of the "extraneous", of the "barbarians" who do not have their religion, language, culture or traditions. Although barbarians often turn out

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to be more aristocratic than the local ones. It is a fact even in the inner identity. In Bulgarian folklore, there is an expression: "I call you daughter, but it's you, my daughter-in-law", expressing the attitude of "their own" mother-in-law to her "extraneous" daughter-in-law who came to her home. This is embedded in the sense of the concept of "identity" and its overcoming is a slow and difficult process of initiation (acquisition of the new social status), which is obligatory for every "extraneous" to become "their own". That is until the daughter-in-law does not become a mother-in-law. This primary fear is imperative to be overcome precisely through the discovery of otherness. Figuratively speaking, then the daughter-in-law will become a daughter indeed. Such was the perception of Spanish workers in France in 1986, now there is no sign of this relationship. This is also a problem, which is clearly underestimated.

Solutions must be sought, and they do exist. For example, not to affect national history in any way, but to free the field of history since the World War II. At this stage, there is no point in seeking the creation of post-modern identity from the Roman Empire or from the words of Victor Hugo from 1849. However, the interpretation of history from 1945 should be sought in the light of the reunification of Europe. Thus, national histories would not be affected - the external identities during this period have long been built, and the history from that period onwards evolves as a necessity for countries from the world domination based on real social economic and cultural development rather than on myths. Such a history taught and widely circulated in the EU, is something that is not happening for now. The two narrations - for the external and for the postmodern identity can go in parallel, and as the dividing point - the end of the World

War II, which is the moment of the quantitative accumulation that led to the qualitative change - from the “extraneous” from the terrible enemy lands to their “their own” common land in our Europe. Such an approach would not hurt what was the “The Maid of Orléans” like, Krali Marko or even Robin Hood. It will not hurt “Who is the enemy, who is stalking around us?” too. These issues are not relevant in the formation of post-modern meta-identity. Otherwise, the EU will remain only a brilliant idea, embraced by nationalist quasi-historians and politicians, religious conservatives, myth lovers and cowards.

Finally one more prediction. With the technological development of humankind, if it continues at that pace, the world will soon face the need to upgrade the meta-identity to an even higher level. When we meet other intelligent beings, we will have to identify with it - as citizens of the planet Earth. Therefore, the upgrading of identities is an obligation predetermined to us initially, and not a whim-wham of the fortuity.

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Обединен в многообразието
Ujedinjeni u različitosti
Jednotná v rozmanitosti
Forenet i mangfoldighed
In verscheidenheid verenigd
United in diversity
Ühinenud mitmekesisuses
Moninaisuudessaan yhtenäinen
Unie dans la diversité
In Vielfalt geeint
Ενωμένοι στην πολυμορφία
Egység a sokféleségben
Aontaithe san éagsúlacht
Unita nella diversità
Vienota dažādībā
Suvienijusi įvairovę
Magħquda fid-diversità
Zjednoczona w różnorodności
Unida na diversidade
Uniți în diversitate
Zjednotení v rozmanitosti
Združena v raznolikosti
Unida en la diversidad
Förenade i mångfalden